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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW*

The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered in 1985 by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The purpose of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression
and cases that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North
Dakota law.
The following topics are included in the Review:
Administrative Law and Procedure
A rbitration ..................
.....................3 8
A ttorneys ...................
.....................3 9
Civil Procedure ...............
.....................4 0
Commercial Law .............
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Constitutional Law ............
.....................4 3
Criminal Law and Procedure ..... .....................4 4
Fam ily Law .................
.....................5 7
Indian Law ..................
.....................6 4
Insurance ...................
.....................6 6
P risons .....................
..................... 7 2
Probate .....................
.....................7 3
T orts .. . . ..... .............
..................... 7 5
Vendor and Purchaser ..........
...... .............. 7 7
Workmen's Compensation ......
.....................78
*This project was prepared by the following members of the
staff of the North Dakota Law Review: Sonja Clapp, Michael
Dietz, Diann L. Dunlevy, Theresa Hennemann, Kenneth J.
Horner, Jr., Lora A. Kasper, Louis B. Kuchera, Jeffrey L.
Leclerc, and Tim Schutz.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Pladson v. Hjelle
In Pladson v. Hjelle' the North Dakota State Highway
Commissioner appealed a district court judgment that reversed the
2
Commissioner's decision to revoke Pladson's driving privileges.
At the administrative hearing the patrol officer testified that he had
read Pladson the implied consent advisory but failed to advise him
of his Miranda rights. 3 The officer who administered the
breathalyzer test testified that he complied with the approved
checklist in performing the test, but was unable to vouch for the
changing process of the standard solution or whether the change
was properly made. 4 A prosecutor was not present at the
administrative hearing and the witnesses answered questions from
5
both Pladson's attorney and the hearing officer.
Following the decision to revoke his driving privileges,
Pladson appealed to the district court, which reversed the
Commissioner's decision and reinstated Pladson's driving
privileges. 6 The supreme court stated that it would review only the
administrative hearing decision, not the district court's decision,
and that such a review was limited in scope. 7
The court determined that Pladson's right to due process was
not violated by the hearing officer's dual role as trier of fact and
prosecutor. 8 The court then held that when the Commissioner
introduced certified copies of the state toxicologist reports relating
to the administration of the test, the fairness and accuracy of the
test were prima facie shown. 9 Since Pladson failed to introduce
evidence demonstrating how the test results could have been
affected by the staleness of the solution, the presumption remained
unrebutted. 10
Finally, the court stated that Pladson's constitutional rights
were not violated by the patrol officer's failure to inform him of his
1. 368 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1985).
2. Pladson v. Hjelle, 368 N.W.2d 508, 509 (N.D. 1985).
3. 368 N.W.2d at 509.
4. Id. at 509-10.
5. Id. at 509.
6. Id. at 510.
7. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19(Supp. 1985) (scope and procedure of appeal from an
administrative hearing).
8. 368 N.W.2d at 511. The court emphasized the limited scope of the administrative hearing,
the adequacy of judicial review, and the presence of Pladson's counsel at the hearing, and
determined that no violation of due process had occurred. Id.
9. Id. at 513.
10. Id.
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Miranda rights. The court noted that the fifth amendment does not
apply to implied consent matters and that evidence obtained
pursuant to a consensual blood alcohol test is not "testimonial"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 12 Therefore, the
supreme court concluded that the Commissioner's .decision was
supported by the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions
of law and reversed the district court's decision. 13
Loran v. Iszler
In Loran v. Iszler 4 Loran appealed a district court judgment
dismissing his damages action against an administrative hearing
officer of the North Dakota Highway Department. 15 Iszler, the
hearing officer, had suspended Loran's driving privileges for
driving under the influence of alcohol.16 When Loran appealed the
suspension to the district court, Iszler certified an appeal record
which contained documents that were not entered into evidence at
the hearing. 17 The district court concluded that without the
documents Iszler had no basis to suspend Loran's driving privileges
and reversed the suspension.'
Loran sued Iszler for actual and punitive damages, alleging
that Iszler intentionally invited reliance on a record he knew to be
20
false. 19 Iszler raised the defense of absolute judicial immunity.
The supreme court held that an administrative hearing officer is
immune from suit for damages for discretionary quasi-judicial acts
2
"not done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." 1
The court reasoned that state administrative proceedings are
sufficiently like judicial proceedings to warrant extending
immunity to an administrative hearing officer engaged in a quasijudicial function.22 The court stated that the determination of
whether a function is judicial must be made on a case-by-case
basis. 23 After considering seven relevant factors 24 the court
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 513-14.
Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
368 N.W.2d at 514.
373 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1985).
Loran v. Iszler, 373 N.W.2d 870, 871 (N.D. 1985).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 871-72.
Id. at 872.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 876.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 874.
24. Id. at 873. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 895D comment f (1979) (factors
used to determine what is a discretionary function).
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concluded that Iszler's certification of the appeal record was a
judicial function and not merely a ministerial act. 2 5 The court
further concluded that while Iszler may have erred in including the
documents in the appeal record, he did not act in the clear absence
of all authority.2 6 The court emphasized that abuses of the
administrative hearing process may be corrected on appeal 27 and
28
affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
ARBITRATION
Scherbenske Excavating, Inc. v. North Dakota State Highway Department
In Scherbenske Excavating, Inc. v. North Dakota State Highway
Department29 the Highway Department appealed from a district
court judgment affirming an arbitration award in favor of
Scherbenske and denying the Highway Department's motion to
vacate. 30 The Highway Department raised three issues on appeal.
First, the Highway Department argued that the "completely
irrational" standard of review of arbitration awards should be
abandoned in favor of a more liberal standard. 3 ' After reviewing
the decisions of other jurisdictions that interpreted the scope of the
"completely irrational" standard, the court concluded that it
would continue to employ that standard when reviewing an
arbitrator's decision. 32 The second issue raised by the Highway
Department was whether the arbitrators' use of the "total cost"
method to compute Scherbenske's damages was completely
irrational. 33 The court rejected the Highway Department's
contention, concluding that the arbitrators' use of the "total cost"
method was not devoid of rationality and that the arbitrators did
34
not exceed their powers.
Finally, the Highway Department argued that the arbitrators'
award should be vacated because the arbitrator appointed by
25. 373 N.W.2d at 876.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 876-77.

28. Id.
29. 365 N.W.2d 485 (N.D. 1985).
30. Scherbenske Excavating, Inc. v. North Dakota State Highway Dep't, 365 N.W.2d 485, 486
(N.D. 1985). See N.D. CENT. ConE 5 24-02-26 (1978) (disputes arising out of contracts for the
construction of highways must be submitted to arbitrator).
31. 365 N.W.2d at 487. See Nelson Paving Co., Inc. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1973)
(initial case employing the "completely irrational" standard). In Nelson Pavingthe court determined
that under the "completely irrational" standard, an arbitrators' award will be void only if the award
is a" real injustice or constructive fraud." Id. at 230.
32. 365 N.W.2d at 487-89.
33. Id. at 489. Under the "total cost" method, damages are calculated by subtracting the
contractors estimated costs from those costs actually incurred. Id.
34. Id. at 490.
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Scherbenske demonstrated evident partiality. 35 The court rejected
this claim, stating that the Highway Department's allegations of
bias were remote, uncertain, and speculative. 36 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's judgment.3
ATTORNEYS
Bohn v. Johnson
In Bohn v. Johnson38 Johnson, an attorney, appealed from a
district court judgment entered against her in a legal malpractice
action. 39 Johnson had drafted a partnership agreement for Graydon
Bohn and his brother, Clyde, which contained a buy-out provision
that determined the value of a partner's interest. 40 Upon Clyde's
death, a dispute arose between Graydon and Clyde's widow,
JoAnn, regarding the validity and meaning of the partnership
agreement, and JoAnn commenced an action on behalf of Clyde's
41
estate.
4
In the suit instituted by JoAnn, Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co.,
the supreme court had affirmed a trial court determination that the
written partnership agreement between Graydon and Clyde was
ambiguous, and further, that if Graydon elected to purchase
Clyde's interest, he must pay JoAnn one-half of the fair market
value of the interest.4 3 Graydon's subsequent malpractice action
against Johnson sought damages resulting from her alleged
negligence in drafting the partnership agreement. 44 The45 jury
returned a verdict in favor of Bohn in the malpractice action.
Johnson appealed and argued that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence the judgment, liquidation order, and
settlement agreement from the prior case. 46 The North Dakota
35. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29-08(2) (1976) (authorizing vacatur of an arbitrator's award
for evident partiality).
36. 365 N.W.2d at 490.
37. Id.
38. 371 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1985).
39. Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D. 1985).
40. Id. The agreement provided that on the death of either Clyde or Graydon the surviving
partner had the right to either terminate and liquidate the partnership or purchase the interest of the
decedent. Id. According to the agreement, the value of the partner's interest for the purpose of buyout was determined by the "capital amount" of the decedent's interest. Id.
41. See Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co., 325 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1982). Graydon notified Clyde's
widow that he elected to purchase Clyde's interest in the partnership and made an offer that was
rejected byJoAnn. Id. at 282.
42. Id. at 281 (N.D. 1982).
43. Id. at 285.
44. Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d at 783.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 785.
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Supreme Court noted that, generally, a party is not bound by a
judgment in a previous action to which he was not a party, and that
evidence introduced in the previous action has no evidentiary value
against him in the later action. 47 The court stated that since
Johnson was not a party to and had no direct interest in Bohn
Implement, the judgment, liquidation order, and settlement
48
agreement were incorrectly admitted by the trial court.
The supreme court further noted that Johnson had not been
allowed to introduce evidence that the judgment in Bohn Implement
resulted from matters other than the ambiguity of the partnership
agreement orJohnson's negligence. 4 9 The court concluded that the
erroneous admission of the documents from Bohn Implement, plus
the failure to allow Johnson to present countervailing5 0 evidence,
deprivedJohnson of a fair opportunity to defend herself.
The court also found that the ambiguity in the partnership
buy-out provision did not result in a buy-out price of fair market
value, but rather created a question of fact concerning the parties'
52
intent. 5' Thus the court remanded the case for a new trial.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Heartview Foundationv. Glaser
In Heartuiew Foundation v. Glaser-3 Heartview and Sandbo, an
alcoholism counselor, petitioned the supreme court to issue a
supervisory writ commanding the district court to vacate its order
compelling Heartview to answer a particular interrogatory.5 4 The
interrogatory was requested as part of a malpractice action initiated
by a former Heartview patient, 55 and requested the names of other
Heartview patients who were members of the plaintiff's treatment
group. 56 The district court ordered Heartview and Sandbo to
47. Id. The court acknowledged that it may be necessary to admit evidence from a prior case,
even though the defendant attorney was not a party to the previous action, if the attorney's conduct
in the prior litigation is in issue. Id. at 786-87. Since Johnson's conduct in the prior case was not in
issue, evidence from Bohn Implement was not admissible. See id. at 787.
48. See id. at 786-87. The court stated that Bohn'was entitled to produce evidence from the prior
case only to show that his purchase offer had been rejected and that the judgment required him to
pay fair market value for the purchase ofClyde's interest. Id. at 785.
49. Id. at 787,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 788. An ambiguity in a buy-out provision may be removed if the survivor is able to
prove by clear and convincing extrinsic evidence that the parties had agreed to a buy-out price of less
than fair market value. Id. at 789. In the absence of such proof, the deceased partner's estate is
entitled to receive fair market value as of the date of death. Id.
52. Id. at 790.
53. 361 N.W.2d 232 (N.D. 1985).
54. Heartview Found. v. Glaser, 361 N.W.2d 232, 233 (N.D. 1985).
55. Id.
56. Id.

19861

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

answer the interrogatory, reasoning that good cause for disclosure
existed, and further, that the former patients had waived their right
to privacy by not using pseudonyms.5 7
The supreme court exercised supervisory jurisdiction to
review the district court's order because Heartview and Sandbo
had no viable alternative remedy.5 8 In determining whether
disclosure of the patients' identities was appropriate, the court
59
considered the applicability of federal statutes and regulations.
The regulations require that a patient receive notice of any
proceeding to authorize disclosure. 60 Since notice was not given in
the present case, the supreme court determined that the district
court erred in compelling disclosure. 61 Finally, the court noted that
the mere failure to use a pseudonym amounted to neither an
express nor an implied waiver of the patients' privilege of
62
confidentiality.
Loken v. Magrum
In Loken v. Magrum63 Loken appealed a summary judgment in
favor of nonresident defendants. 64 The district court granted the
summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. 65 Loken
appealed the decision on two grounds. 66 First, Loken contended
that although he did not comply with section 39-01-12 of the North
Dakota Century Code, requiring personal service of process, 67 he
did not need to do so because he had complied with section 39-0111 of the North Dakota Century Code, allowing service upon the
highway commissioner. 68 Second, Loken contended that an answer
filed and a deposition taken by attorneys at the request of the
a voluntary
insurance company constituted
defendant's
69
appearance by the defendants.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 234. The court noted that the parties had not addressed the issue of whether the court
had jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ. Id. at 233.
59. Id. at 234. The court did not expressly determine whether the pertinent federal statutes and
regulations applied to the controversy. Id. at 235. The court, however, implied that federal law
applied as it instructed the district court to follow the federal regulations that were applicable. Id. at
235-36.
60. Id. at 234. See 42 C.F.R. S 2.64(b) (1984) (the patient, if not a party to the suit, must be
given notice of the proceeding seeking authorization for disclosure).
61. 361 N.W.2d at 235.
62. Id.
63. 364 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1985).
64. Loken v. Magrum, 364 N.W. 2d 79, 79 (N.D. 1985).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 80, 82.
67. Id. at 80. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-01-12 (1980) (notice of service, summons, and
complaint must be sent to nonresident defendant by mail).
68. 364 N.W.2d at 80. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-01-11 (1980) (nonresident motorist is deemed
to appoint the highway commissioner as agent for service of process).
69. See 364 N.W.2d at 80, 82.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court first concluded that unless
the defendant makes a voluntary appearance, both sections, 39-0112 and 39-01-11, must be complied with before a court will have
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 70 The court
71
noted that the two statutes were originally enacted as one statute.
The statute was divided by the 1943 Code revisors to promote
clarity, but not to change its meaning. 72
Regarding Loken's second contention, the court noted that
a voluntary appearance by the defendants would subject them to
the jurisdiction of the court. 73 The court stated, however, that when
a party other than the defendant makes the appearance, that party
must be authorized by the defendant to appear for him. 74 The court
concluded that since the attorneys made an appearance on behalf of
the defendant's insurance company, and not on behalf of the
defendants,
the defendants had not made a voluntary
75
appearance. Thus, the supreme court affirmed the district court's
76
finding that it had no personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
COMMERCIAL LAW
Heidt v. State
In Heidt v. State 77 the supreme court determined that a
mortgagor who raises the "confiscatory price" defense is entitled to
an injunction against foreclosure by advertisement. 78 The
plaintiffs, owners of a farm-ranch operation, received a loan from
the Bank of North Dakota that was secured by a mortgage on their
land. 79 After the plaintiffs' defaulted, the Bank of North Dakota
served a notice of intention to foreclose by advertisement. 80 To
enjoin the foreclosure, plaintiffs filed a motion with a supporting
affidavit alleging the "confiscatory price" defense. 8 1 The trial court
82
denied the motion and the plaintiff appealed.
70. Id. at 82.
71. Id. at81.
72. Id. at 81-82.
73. Id. at 83.
74. Id.
75. Seeid. at 80, 83.
76. Id.
77. 372 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1985).
78. Heidt v. State, 372 N.W.2d 857, 860 (N.D. 1985).
79. Id. at 857.
80. See id. at 857-58. The notice indicated that the bank would proceed pursuant to chapter 3522 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 858. See N.D. CENT. COoE ch. 35-22 (1980) (foreclosure
by advertisement).
81. 372 N.W.2d at 858. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974) (relief from default and
hardship may be granted by a court when prices are confiscatory).
82. 372 N.W.2d at 858.
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The supreme court noted that section 35-22-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that ajudge may enjoin foreclosure
by advertisement if the mortgagor asserts a legal counterclaim or
defense. 8 3 The court stated that a subsequent hearing is used only
to determine the validity, not the merits, of the defense or
counterclaim. 84 Thus, the court held that when a mortgagor raises
the "confiscatory price" defense, he is entitled to an injunction
against foreclosure by advertisement as a matter of law. 85
The court also considered whether the morgagor claiming the
defense must be in possession of farm products at the time of the
hearing.8 6 The court stated that it is reasonable to believe that if the
cost of production exceeds the market price of the farm goods, the
farmer would have been forced to sell his goods. 87 Therefore, the
court held that the mortgagor need not be in possession of farm
products at the time of his hearing on the confiscatory price
defense. 88
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State v. Clark
In State v. Clark8 9 the State of North Dakota appealed a county
court's dismissal of a complaint brought against the defendant,
Clark. 90 Clark was charged for writing checks without having
sufficient funds in his checking account. 91 The county court's
dismissal was based on State v. Fischer,92 a North Dakota Supreme
Court decision, which declared the nonsufficient fund check law
contained in section 6-08-16 of the North Dakota Century Code, as
amended in 1983, unconstitutional. 93 The issue before the court in
Clark was whether the unconstitutionality of the 1983 amendment
94
to section 6-08-16 rendered the 1981 version of the statute invalid.
In Fischer the court determined that the entire 1983 version of
section 6-08-16 was invalid. 95 The court premised its determnination
83. Id. at 860. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 35-22-04 (1980) (procedure for foreclosure by
advertisement).
84. 372 N.W.2d at 860.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 861.
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985).
90. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 168 (N.D. 1985).
91. Id.
92. 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1984).
93. 367 N.W.2d at 168. SeeState v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1984) (declaring North
Dakota's nonsufficient fund check law, as amended in 1983, unconstitutional); Act of Apr. 8, 1983,
ch. 116, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 296 (nonsufficient fund check law as amended in 1983).
94. 367 N.W.2d at 168-69.
95. 349 N.W.2d at 18.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:35

on the 1983 legislature's intention to provide an affirmative defense
of payment in section 6-08-16.96 The court in Fischerstated that the
defense constituted "an important and integral part of" the 1983
statute. 97 The court determined that the unconstitutional language
in the 1983 amendment could not be severed from the
constitutional so that the remaining portion of the statute would
provide a payment defense. 98 Therefore, the court declared the
entire statute invalid because the legislature did not intend the
statute to stand without the payment defense. 99
In Clark the defendant argued that because the 1981 version of
section 6-08-16 did not contain a payment defense it was also
invalid. 10 0 The court maintained that its determination that the
unconstitutional language of the 1983 amendment could not be
severed from the statute and still maintain the legislative intent was
a separate issue from whether the 1981 version of section 6-08-16
was in full force and effect.101 The court noted that North
Dakota"had had a 'bad check' statute continuously since 1915,"
which demonstrated "a definitive and settled legislative policy of
policing the issuance of nonsufficient funds checks." 102 The court
concluded that it would be unreasonable to presume that the 1983
legislature intended to fracture this tradition. 103
The supreme court determined that the invalidation of the
1983 amendments reenacted the 1981 version of section 6-08-16,
which did not contain the unconstitutional language that was
present in the 1983 amendment. 10 4 Consequently, the State could
charge Clark with violating the 1981 version of section 6-08-16.105
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Manke
In State v. Manke'0 6 Manke appealed from an order dismissing
his application for post conviction relief.'1 7 At his trial, in which
Manke was convicted of gross sexual imposition, a laboratory
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 367 N.W.2d at 169.
101. Id. at 169-70.
102. Id. at 170.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 169 (citing State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1984)).
105. Id.
106. 361 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1985).
107. State v. Manke, 361 N.W.2d 247, 247 (N.D. 1985).
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report was admitted into evidence. 10 8 Manke's counsel declined to
call the preparer of the laboratory report for cross-examination. 109
Manke applied for post conviction relief alleging that the
laboratory report was inadmissible. 10 The supreme court affirmed
the district court's denial of Manke's application, holding that the
post conviction proceedings do not allow a defendant multiple
opportunities to raise the same issues that have been previously
adjudicated on a prior direct appeal.I'
North Dakota law allows for application for post conviction
relief pursuant to chapter 29-32 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 112 The supreme court, however, interpreted section 29-32-08
to indicate that issues finally adjudicated in a prior direct appeal
113
cannot be raised in a subsequent post. conviction proceeding.
The supreme court had previously upheld the admission of the
laboratory report on Manke's direct appeal from his conviction.114
The court reasoned that the decision on direct appeal was a final
judgment and, therefore, barred any post conviction proceeding on
the same issue. 115 A supplemental issue that Manke raised for the
first time in his post-conviction application was not considered by
the supreme court. 116
State v. Kimball
In State v. Kimball"7 Kimball was convicted of driving while
intoxicated. " 8 He was alternatively charged with violations of both
driving while having a blood alcohol concentration of over ten onehundredths of one percent by weight and driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. 119 The defendant's blood alcohol
108. Id. at 248.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 248-49.
112. Id. at 248. SeeN.D. CENT. CODECh. 29-32 (1974) (procedures for post conviction relief).
113. 361 N.W.2d at 248. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE S 29-32-08 (1974) (waiver of grounds for relief).
114. 361 N.W.2d at 248. See State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982).
115. 361 N.W.2d at 248-49.
116. Id. at 249.
117. 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1985).
118. State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601,602 (N.D. 1985).
119. Id. at 603. Kimball was charged with violating both subsections (a) and (b) of § 39-08-01(1)
of the North Dakota Century Code. The subsections provide as follows:
1. A person may not drive any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas
to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if any of the
following apply:
a. That person has a blood alcohol concentration of at least ten onehundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a
chemical test within two hours after the driving.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
N.D. CENT. CODE §

39

-08-01(1)(a), (b)(Supp. 1985).
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test result of 0. 1.1 percent was admitted into evidence. 12 0 Kimball
appealed his conviction, contending that the State failed to lay a
proper foundation for the admission of his blood test into
evidence 2' 1 and that the extraction of his blood constituted an
122
unreasonable search and seizure.
Kimball argued that the test was inadmissible because the
State could not prove that the blood test was administered within
two hours of driving, as required by section 39-08-01(1)(a). 123 The
124
court did not agree that this precluded the use of the blood test.
Although Kimball could not be convicted under section 39-0801(1)(a) because the test may not have been performed within two
hours of driving, the test was admissible evidence to prove a
125
violation of section 39-08-01(1)(b).
To convict a defendant under section 39-08-01(1)(b) the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person was driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 126 A chemical test is not
required for conviction; however, a test may be admitted to help
prove that a person was under the influence of alcohol. 127 When
used in this manner, the test is not subject to a two hour
limitation.1 28 Thus, the court determined that Kimball's chemical
129
test was admissible to prove a violation of section 39-08- 01(1)(b).
The court next discussed Kimball's contention that the blood
test results should have been suppressed as a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure. 13 0 The court agreed that the
extraction of blood was a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, but determined that blood could be taken as a search
incident to arrest under certain conditions. 131 First, there must be a
clear indication that incriminating evidence will be found. 132 The
police officer stated that Kimball behaved in a manner suggesting
intoxication, thus clearly indicating that incriminating evidence

120. 361 N.W.2d at 602.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id. at 603. See supra note 119 for the text of § 39-08-01(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century
Code.
124. 361 N.W.2d at 603.
125. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (Supp. 1985) (governing admissibility of chemical
tests). See supra note 119 for the text of § 39-08-01(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code.
126. 361 N.W.2d at 603. See supra note 119 for a text of 5 39-08-01(l)(b) of the North Dakota
Century Code.
127. 361 N.W.2d at 603.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 604.
131. Id. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (setting forth the conditions for a
proper search incident to arrest).
132. 361 N.W.2d at 604.
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was present. 13 3 Second, the test must be performed in a reasonable
manner. 3 4 Kimball's blood was drawn by a registered nurse in a
hospital. 3 5 Since both conditions were satisfied, the court upheld
136
the extraction of blood as a valid search incident to an arrest.
State v. Mertz
In State v. Mertz13 7 Mertz appealed his conviction for driving a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 138 An officer
stopped Mertz for speeding and ordered Mertz into the patrol car
after Mertz retrieved his license from his trunk. 139 After Mertz
failed various field sobriety tests the officer placed him under arrest
and transported him to a law enforcement center for a blood alcohol
test. 140 The officer read Mertz the implied consent advisory but
Mertz refused to sign, stating that he did not understand the
statute. 14' A patrolman explained the statute, after which another
patrol officer administered a breathalyzer test that showed a
42
reading of 0.17 percent of alcohol in Mertz's blood. 1
Mertz raised two issues on appeal. Mertz first argued that by
ordering him into the patrol car, the officer effected a custodial
arrest without probable cause, and then conducted an illegal search
of his person. 1 43 Mertz argued that all the evidence obtained after
this unlawful seizure should have been supressed. 1 44 The supreme
court's analysis focused on whether the police officer acted
reasonably in ordering Mertz into the patrol car. 145 The court
acknowledged an additional incremental invasion of privacy when
a driver is ordered to sit in a patrol car. 46 But, the court reasoned,
the concern about increased intrusion is outweighed by concerns
for the safety of the driver and police officer. 147 Accordingly, the
48
court held that the officer acted reasonably. 1
133. Id. Officer Hummell noted an odor of alcohol on Kimball's breath, slurred speech,
bloodshot eyes, and that Kimball had been involved in an auto accident. Id.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court approved the holding in Kimball in State v. Allery, 371 N.W.2d 133 (N.D.
1985).
137. 362 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1985).
138. State v. Mertz, 362 N.W.2d 410, 411 (N.D. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 411-12.
141. Id. at 412. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1985) (driving under the influence
prohibited).
142. 362 N.W.2d at 412.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 413.
147. Id.
148. Id. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mimms the Supreme Court
determined that concerns for officer safety justified an officer's request that a driver exit his vehicle
after being stopped. Id. at 111.
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Mertz's second argument was that since he did not consent to
the breathalyzer test, the results should have been suppressed. 149 In
support of his contention Mertz pointed to his refusal to sign the
request and notice form.15 0 The supreme court noted that the
North Dakota Legislature had modified the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Schmerber v. California'5 1 by enacting an implied
consent statute that allows drivers in North Dakota to refuse to take
a blood alcohol test.I5 2 The court went on to state, however, that to
expressly withdraw his implied consent a driver must affirmatively
refuse to participate in the test. 5 3 Since Mertz participated in the
breathalyzer test he did not effectively revoke his implied consent,
and thus the results of the test were properly admitted. 1 54 Finally,
the court rejected Mertz's contention that the verdict was not
55
supported by substantial evidence. 1
State v. Coutts
In State v. Coutts 156 Coutts appealed to the supreme court,
asserting that the trial court erred in convicting her of the commonlaw crime of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.1 57 The
trial court determined that the North Dakota conspiracy statute 5 8
does not apply to crimes prohibited by the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act set forth in chapter 19-03.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 5 9 Instead, the trial court held that the proper
charge against Coutts was common-law conspiracy and found her
guilty of that offense. 160 The State contended that the conspiracy
149. 362 N.W.2d at 413.
150. Id.
151. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the decision in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), authorized police to obtain a blood sample pursuant
to a search incident to arrest, regardless of the person's consent, provided two factors are met. Mertz,
362 N.W.2d at 413 (citing Schmerber); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. First, there must be a clear
indication that the test will produce evidence, and second, the test must be performed in a reasonable
manner. 362 N.W.2d at 413; see also State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601, 604-05 (N.D. 1985).
152. 362 N.W.2d at 413. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (Supp. 1985) (setting forth the
penalty for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test).
153. 362 N.W.2d at 413-14.
154. Id. at 414.
155. Id.
156. 364 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1985).
157. State v. Coutts, 364 N.W.2d 88, 90 (N.D. 1985). Coutts argued that for attempt or
conspiracy to apply to an offense outside of the conspiracy statute contained in title 12.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code, attempt or conspiracy must be listed as applicable to that particular offense.
Id. at 91. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-06 (criminal attempt, facilitation, solicitation, and
conspiracy). Therefore, Coutts contended that she could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to deliver a
controlled substance because the prohibition against drug delivery is codified outside of title 12.1.
364 N.W.2d at 92.
158. See N.D. CENT. CODE §5 12.1-06-04, -05 (1985) (criminal conspiracy).
159. 364 N.W.2d at 90. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 19-03.1 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (Uniform
Controlled Substances Act).
160. 364 N.W.2d at 90.
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statute applied to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and,
therefore, the court should have convicted Coutts of statutory
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. 161
In a case of first impression the supreme court agreed with the
State and held that the conspiracy provisions of section 12.1-06-04
and section 12.1-06-05 of the North Dakota Century Code apply
to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 162 The court reasoned
that since most, if not all state statutory schemes provide for
prosecution of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, it was
unlikely that the North Dakota Legislature intended to prohibit
prosecution for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.16 3 The
court therefore affirmed Coutt's conviction of criminal conspiracy
on the basis of the statutory crime of conspiracy. 164
State v. Vetsch
In State v. Vetsch 165 the defendant appealed a jury trial
conviction of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. 1 66 Vetsch moved to suppress the test result,
claiming that the blood alcohol test had not been performed within
two hours after driving as required by section 39-20-07(3) of the
67
North Dakota Century Code. 1
The supreme court stated that it is the duty of the trial court to
make a preliminary determination of whether the test was properly
obtained and fairly administered, and that it is for the jury to assess
the relevancy and weight of the test. 168 The court reasoned that any
conflicting evidence over whether the blood test was performed
within two hours of driving went to the use and weight to be given
69
to the test report, not to its reliability. 1
The court found sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the blood test was performed within two hours. 170 Subsection 8 of
section 39-20-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that a
161. Id.
162. Id. at 92.
163. Id.
164. Id. The supreme court noted that when statutory law controls, the common law is not
considered. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1975) (no common law if law declared by the
code). The court therefore concluded that the trial court erred in convicting Coutts of the common
law crime of conspiracy. 364 N.W.2d at 92.
165. 368 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1985).
166. State v. Vetsch, 368 N.W.2d 547, 548 (N.D. 1985).
167. Id. at 548-49. Subsection 3 of § 39-20-07 of the North Dakota Century Code requires that
the blood alcohol test be performed within two hours after driving or being in physical control of a
vehicle. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(3)(Supp. 1985).
168. 368 N.W.2d at 550 & n.2.
169. Id. at 550.
170. Id.
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signed statement by the nurse drawing the blood sample is prima
facie evidence that the blood sample was properly drawn and
requires no further foundation for the admission of the blood
sample."'7 The nurse who performed the blood test testified at trial
17 2
that she complied with the procedures on the signed statement.
Accordingly, the court found that the trial court properly admitted
the test results into evidence. 173 Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of
17
the blood alcohol test results.

4

State v. Thompson
In State v. Thompson175 Randy and Jackie Thompson appealed
their county court convictions for possession of drug
paraphernalia. 7 6 They contended that their convictions were
predicated on evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that
was issued without probable cause under the requirements of either
the Gates1 7 7 or Aguilar

78

-Spinell '

79

tests. 18 0

After reviewing the contents of the affidavit that was used as
the basis for the warrant, the supreme court concluded that the
affidavit failed to set forth any facts indicating that the anonymous
informant was privy to personal information which would lend
credence to the unverified allegations.

18 1

Further, the court stated

that insufficient information existed to determine whether the
82
informant was the source of reliable information in the past.1
Thus, the court concluded that the affidavit did not meet even the
more liberal "totality of the circumstances" test, which the court
83
declined to adopt. 1
171. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-07(10) (Supp. 1985).
172. 368 N.W.2d at 549.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 553.
175. 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985).
176. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 366 (N.D. 1985).
177. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates the United States Supreme
Court determined that magistrates are allowed to make common sense determinations in issuing
search warrants. Id. at 230. The court stated that the determination should be based on the totality of
the circumstances of whether or not there is a fair probability that the search will reveal contraband.
Id.
178. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar the court stated that an
affidavit containing hearsay information must give the magistrate the basis of the informant's
knowledge and'circumstances by which the affiant concluded that the informant is reliable. Id. at
114.
179. See generaly Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969) (further refining the twoprong test set forth inAguilar).
180. 369 N.W.2d at 366.
181. Id. at 368.
182. Id. at 369.
183. Id. at 370, 372 & n.5.
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The court then considered whether the evidence should be
admitted under the United States v. Leon'18 4 "good faith exception" to
the exclusionary rule. 1 85 While declining to adopt the "good faith
exception" the court stated that the exception, even if adopted,
would not apply in this case since the officer's reliance on the
18 6
magistrate's determination of probable cause was unreasonable.
Accordingly, the defendant's convictions were reversed and the
district court's suppression order affirmed. 187 Justice Levine wrote
a special concurrence emphasizing that the court had not adopted
either the "totality of the circumstances" or "good faith
exception" standards. 188
Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner
In Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner'8 9 Moser

appealed his conviction for driving while under the influence of
alcohol. 190 Moser had been given a breathalyzer test that showed a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.19 percent by weight. 19 1 His
license was suspended by an administrative hearing officer, and the
suspension was affirmed by a district court. 19 2 Moser appealed to
the supreme court claiming that the result of the test was
inadmissible since the breathalyzer machine had not been correctly
"zeroed" before the test was administered. 193
The supreme court stated that the proper evidentiary
foundation can be laid for the admission of a breathalyzer test result
by showing that the test was administered in accordance with the
approved method. 194 The approved method requires that the
machine have a zero reading before administration, a condition not
met in the Moser case.195 Therefore, the court held that the test was
96
incorrectly administered and thus inadmissible as evidence. 1
184. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In Leon the Supreme Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate that was later found to lack probable cause. United States v. Leon, 104 S.
Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984).
185. 369 N.W.2d at 370-72.
186. Id. at 372 & n.5.
187. Id. at 372.
188. Id. at 372-74.
189. 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1985).
190. Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 369 N.W.2d 650, 651 (N.D. 1985).
191. Id. at 652.
192. Id. The administrative hearing officer concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds to believe Moser was under the influence of alcohol and that the breathalyzer test was fairly
administered. Id.
193. See id. at 652-53.
194. Id. at 653.
195. Id. at 653-54. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (Supp. 1983) (interpretation and
equirements of chemical tests).
196. 369 N.W.2d at 654.
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The supreme court noted that, as an alternative, the
foundation for the test result might have been laid if the state
toxicologist, who filed the test result with the clerk of district court,
had testified concerning the accuracy of the test as administered to
Moser. 197 Because no such testimony was given, the decision to
suspend Moser's license was reversed. 19
State v. Nace
In State v. Nace' 9 9 Nace appealed the district court's denial of
his motion to correct his sentence as illegal and excessive.20 0 Nace
was convicted of theft of property, a class C felony, and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment with two years suspended and
probation for three years following his release. 20 1 Nace contended
that the district court did not have power to "suspend" a part of his
sentence and moved for correction of the sentence under Rule 35 of
the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, 20 2 arguing that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence of imprisonment
20 3
for his offense.
The state contended that although statutory law authorizes
appeal in a criminal case, 20 4 a rule 35 order denying correction or
reduction of a sentence was not appealable because the Uniform
Post Conviction Procedure Act 20 5 was the exclusive method to
collaterally attack an illegal or excessive sentence. 20 6 The supreme
court stated that rule 35(a) and the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedures Act coexist for similar purposes regarding illegal
sentences. 20 7 The court determined that the legislature authorized
an appeal from an order denying correction of a sentence claimed
to be illegal under rule 35(a) through subsection 5 of section 29-2806 of the North Dakota Century Code if the appeal affected a
substantial right of the defendant. 20 8 The court held that the ability
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 371 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1985).
200. State v. Nace, 371 N.W.2d 129, 130(N.D. 1985).
201. Id.
202. Id. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (sentencing court may correct illegal sentence at any time).
203. 371 N.W.2d at 130.
204. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-28-06(5) (1974) (defendant may appeal from order made
afterjudgment affecting any substantial right).
205. 371 N.N.2d at 130. See Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, ch. 304, 1969 N.D. Sess.
Law 620, repealed by Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, ch. 366, 1985 N.D. Sess. Law 1377
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-01 (1985)) (except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this
remedy takes place of all other common law or statutory remedies and shall be used exclusively in
place of them).
206. 371 N.W.2d at 131.
207. Id.
208. Id. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-06(5)(1974).
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to correct an illegal sentence is a substantial right of a defendant. 20 9
Nace also contended that it was not lawful for the trial court to
suspend only a part of his sentence of imprisonment. 2 10 The
supreme court disagreed and stated that a "suspension" is a form
of probation available under the general sentencing alternatives of
section 12.1-32-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, and is one
21
of the combinations of permissible sentences under that section. '
Nace's primary contention was that his combined term of
three years imprisonment and three years probation could not
exceed the statutorily allowed maximum term of five years
imprisonment.2 12 The supreme court stated that section 12.1-3202(1) and chapter 12-53 of the North Dakota Century Code made it
clear that the combined term of Nace's imprisonment and
probation could not exceed five years. 21 3 Thus, the court concluded
that Nace's sentence exceeded the maximum sentence of
imprisonment and remanded the case to the district court for
2 14
resentencing.
State v. Riedinger
In State v. Riedinger2t 5 the state appealed from an order
suppressing all evidence other than marijuana and paraphernalia
seized under a series of three search warrants. 2 16 After arranging an
undercover purchase of marijuana from Fetzer, law enforcement
officers followed him to the home of Eugene Frank and Wayne
Otto. 21 7 The officers observed Fetzer speak to Otto, but did not see

an exchange of money or marijuana. Fetzer returned without the
money the police officers had given him for marijuana. 218 The
officers obtained a warrant to search Frank and Otto's home for
controlled substances and fifty dollars in currency. 21 9 One of the
officers also thought that this search may provide an opportunity to
209. 371 N.W.2d at 130. In determining that the opportunity to correct an illegal sentence is a
substantial right, the court emphasized that rule 35(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifies that the sentencing court may correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Id. See
N.D.R. Civ. P. 35(a).
210, 371 N.W.2d at 132.
211 Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (1985) (providing a list of alternative sentences).
212. 371 N.W,2d at 132. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-32- 01(4) (1985) (maximum penalty for a
class C felony includes five year imprisonment).
213. 371 N.W.2d at 132. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32- 02(1) (1985) (imposed sentences may
not exceed the maximum sentence of imprisonment); id. ch. 12-53 (1985) (statutes involving
suspended sentences).
214. 371 N.W.2d at 132.
215. 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985).
216. State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 868 (N.D. 1985).
217. Id. at 869.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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observe stolen goods to connect Otto with burglaries. 220 After
observing stolen items during the search for controlled substances,
the officers obtained two additional warrants.2 2 1 The officers seized
marijuana, paraphernalia, a stolen microwave oven, and other
222
contraband items pursuant to the three warrants.
Riedinger, who was in the house when the searches were
performed and was charged with possession of stolen property,
moved to suppress all items seized on the grounds that the officers
used illegal evidence to show probable cause for obtaining the
warrants. 223 The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision
to suppress items other than the marijuana and paraphernalia.224
The supreme court declined to analyze search and seizure
5
issues in terms of the motive or intent of the officers involved, 22
but instead applied an objective reasonableness standard. 226 The
court determined that the officers' reasonable suspicions led to the
seizure of items found in "plain view," and that the requirements
of the plain view doctrine were reasonably met by the officers
involved. 22 7 Although the officers suspected that stolen property
was present at the house, the discovery of the property was
inadvertent. 228 Further, the easy verification of the property as
stolen satisfied the "immediately identifiable as probable
229
contraband or evidence" requirement.
State v. Goehring
In State v. Goehring230 the defendant appealed a county court
conviction that found him guilty of driving with a suspended
driver's license. 231 Goehring was driving his employer's van when
pulled over by a North Dakota highway patrolman.23 2 The
patrolman's sole purpose for stopping Goehring was to conduct a

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. During the initial search, the officers identified other stolen property. Id. They then
obtained two additional warrants to search the premises for specific stolen property. Id.
223. Id. at 869-70.
224. Id. at 868.
225. Id. at 871-72. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, (rejecting officer motive as the key
to search and seizure analysis), reh "gdenied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978).
226. 374 N.W.2d at 872. The supreme court made it clear that its application of the oblective
reasonableness standard did not mean that motive or intent of officers is always irrelevant to search
and seizure issues. Id.
227. Id. at 875.
228. Id. at 874.
229. Id. at 875-76.
230. 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1985).
231. State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882, 883 (N.D. 1985).
232. Id.
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safety inspection of the vehicle.23 3 Upon completing the inspection,
the officer requested to see Goehring's driver's license.2 3 4 After
noticing that Goehring's license was expired, the officer ran a radio
23 5
check on the license, which revealed that it had been suspended.
236
Goehring was then arrested.
Goehring moved to dismiss the case in November of 1984,
claiming that the officer's safety check was an unconstitutional
search under the fourth amendment. 23 7 Goehring renewed the
motion to dismiss in January of 1985 at the same time he made a
motion to suppress evidence relating to the suspension of his
23 9
license. 238 The trial court denied both of Goehring's motions.
On appeal the State argued that the dismissal of the motion to
240
suppress should be affirmed since it was made just before trial.
The supreme court noted that the motion to suppress involved the
same legal issues as the two motions to dismiss. 241 The court
determined that since the initial motion to dismiss was made two
months before trial, the state had sufficient time to prepare and
242
respond to the motion.
The court next addressed Goehring's contention that the
officer's search prior to the arrest was unconstitutional. 243 In
Delaware v. Prouse244 the United States Supreme Court held that
stopping a driver to check his drivers license, without articulable
and reasonable suspicion, is an unconstrained exercise of discretion
and unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 245 The court in
Goehring noted that the officer had stated that the search procedures
he performed on Goehring were standard procedures of the North
Dakota State Highway Patrol. 24 6 However, the state failed to
establish a record regarding the procedures used when a safety
inspection is performed on a vehicle. 24 7 As such, the court could not
determine the degree of discretion the officer had in deciding which
vehicles to inspect. 24 81 Since the state failed to prove that the
233. Id.
234. Id. at 884.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.

238. Id.
239. Id.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 886.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
374 N.W.2d at 888.
Id.
1d.
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inspection complied with the fourth amendment, the supreme court
2 49
reversed the trial court's judgment.
State v. Orr
In State v. Orr5 0 Orr appealed from an order sentencing him to
mandatory imprisonment after he was convicted of driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) twice within five years.25 1
Prior to this second conviction, Orr, without an attorney, pleaded
guilty to a DUI charge in municipal court and received a fine and a
2 52
five day suspended jail sentence.
The State's complaint alleged that if Orr was convicted for the
current DUI he should be sentenced as a second offender pursuant
253
to section 39-08-01(5) (b) of the North Dakota Century Code.
Orr contended that since there was no proof in the municipal court
judgment to show that he had waived his right to counsel in his
prior DUI conviction, his sentence could not be enhanced by the
previous conviction. 254 The supreme court agreed and rejected the
trial court's determination that Orr could be presumed to have
waived his right to counsel when nothing in the municipal court
255
judgment affirmatively indicated that a valid waiver occurred.
The court noted that by entering a plea of guilty, a defendant gives
up numerous constitutional rights: the right to a trial by jury, the
right of confrontation, and the right to the privilege against selfincrimination. 25 6 The court concluded that the trial court could not
assume that Orr surrendered important constitutional rights if the
257
record did not contain proof of Orr's waiver of counsel.
The last issue addressed by the supreme court was who had the
burden of proving the validity of Orr's uncounseled conviction to
justify its use to enhance punishment when the court record was
silent. 258 The court reasoned that, because the State was attempting
to sentence Orr as a second offender, it had the burden of proving
Orr's waiver of counsel. 259 The State failed to meet its burden and
249. Id.
250. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
251. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 173 (N.D. 1985).
252. Id.
253. Id. See N.D. CENT. ConE § 39-08-01(5)(b) (Supp. 1985) (mandatory four day sentence for
second offense within five years).
254. 375 N.W.2d at 173.
255. Id. at 174.
256. Id. (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)).
257. Id. (citing State v. Hagemann, 326 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1982)).
258. Id. at 179.
259. Id. The court noted that proof of a valid waiver could be established by parol evidence. Id.
at 179-80.
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the supreme court reversed and remanded the case with
instructions that Orr be sentenced without consideration of his
260
prior DUI conviction.
State v. Muralt
In State v. Muralt261 Muralt appealed his conviction for
possession of a pistol by a felon. 262 After responding to a
disturbance caused by the continuous blowing of a car horn, the
263
police found Muralt unconscious in the front seat of his car.
4
Muralt was placed under arrest and his vehicle was impounded. 26
The police then obtained an impound inventory form and began to
search Muralt's car. 265 On the back seat of the car the police officer
found a canvas bag that contained a sawed-off shotgun and
shells.266

On appeal Muralt argued that the weapon should have been
suppressed as the product of an unlawful seizure. 267 The supreme
court noted that other jurisdictions disagree about whether the
policies underlying an inventory search extend to the search of
containers found in the passenger compartment. 268 Nonetheless,
the court concluded that the policies underlying the inventorysearch exception to the warrant requirement also justify the search
of unlocked containers found in the passenger compartment of an
impounded vehicle, provided the purpose of the search was to
conduct an inventory rather than gather evidence. 269 Accordingly,
the supreme court determined that the trial court was correct in
refusing to suppress the evidence and affirmed the conviction. 270
FAMILY LAW
Wilson v. Wilson
In Wilson v. Wilson 271 John Wilson appealed from a district
260. Id. at 179-80.
261. 376 N.W 2d 25 (N.D. 1985).
262. State v. Muralt, 376 N.W.2d 25, 26 (N.D. 1985).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. The district court had ruled that the search of the bag was a lawful inventory search. Id.
(citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). The supreme court, however, stated that
Opperman did not reach the issue of whether an inventory search would justify the search of containers
found in the passenger compartment. Id.
268. Id. at 26-27.
269. Id. at 27.
270. Id.
271.364N.W.2d 113(N.D. 1985).
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court order that denied his motion to vacate a divorce judgment. 27 2
After Joan Wilson commenced the divorce action, a hearing was
held on an order to show cause. 27 3 John, who had continued to live
with his wife, had notice of the hearing but did not appear. 274 At the
hearing the court granted temporary spousal support to Joan and
ordered John to pay a portion of her attorney fees; John, however,
made no payments. 275 Subsequently Joan petitioned for a default
judgment, and a hearing was held. 276 John was not given notice of
the hearing and was not present in court. 277 The district court
entered a default judgment against John because he did not file an
answer or otherwise make an appearance.2 78 John then made a
motion for relief from the default judgment, which the district court
denied.279
On appealJohn contended that he had made an appearance as
contemplated under rule 55 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure because he and his wife had continued to live together
throughout the divorce proceedings and because they had discussed
the pending divorce proceedings. 280 Furthermore, John contended
that if he had made an appearance, then he was entitled to notice of
the default hearing. 28 ' The supreme court agreed. 282 Noting that the
policy behind rule 55 is to afford litigants a fair opportunity to
adjudicate their disputes on the merits, 283 the court concluded that
John had made an appearance and should have been notified of the
hearing.284 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the denial of the
motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded the case to
2 85
allowJohn to present a defense to the action.
Dennis v. Dennis
In Dennis v. Dennis286 Earl Dennis sought to modify a child
custody decree. 287 Earl and Renae were divorced in North Dakota
272. Wilson v. Wilson, 364 N.W.2d 113, 114 (N.D. 1985).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 115. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 55(a) (appearance by party against whom default judgment
is sought shall be given notice eight days prior to hearing).
281. 364 N.W.2d at 115-16.
282. Id. at 116.
283. Id. at 115 (citing H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d
689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
284. Id. at 116.
285. Id,
286. 366 N.W.2d 474 (N.D. 1985) (2-2-2 decision).
287. Dennis v. Dennis, 366 N.W.2d 474, 475 (N.D. 1985) (2-2-2 decision).
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and Renae was awarded custody of their children.288 Subsequently,
29
Renae moved the children to Iowa where they presently reside.
Earl contended that North Dakota must exercise jurisdiction
290
pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).
The district court found it had no jurisdiction over the matter
because North Dakota was no longer the home state of the
children. 29 1 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a
court that renders an initial custody decree may retain jurisdiction
to modify that decree even though the children involved have
acquired a new home state. 292 In Dennis, all the justices agreed that
the PKPA provisions
governing continuing jurisdiction
29
3
and that Earl's continued residence in North Dakota
controlled,
satisfied the first of those provisions. 294 There was disagreement
among the court, however, concerning the second requirement for
continuing jurisdiction - whether North Dakota had jurisdiction
2 95
pursuant to state law.
ChiefJustice Erickstad and Justice Gierke were of the opinion
that North Dakota had jurisdiction under state law if, at the time of
the petition for modification, North Dakota could have exercised
jurisdiction were this an application for an initial decree. 296 Because
North Dakota could have exercised jurisdiction if a requisite
amount of connections existed between the children and the
state, 297 and because the district court did not determine whether
those connections were present at the time of the petition for
modification, they would remand the case for further findings. 2 98
Justice VandeWalle, with whom Justice Gierke also
concurred, agreed that the case should be remanded for
consideration of the connections between the children and the
state. 2 99 He did, however, express concern that the trial court may
be led on remand to believe that North Dakota lost jurisdiction
once the children obtained a new home state.3 00 Though it may lose
jurisdiction over the custody provisions of the initial decree, Justice
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. See 28 U.S.C. S 1738A (1982).
291. 366 N.W.2d at 475.
292. See id. at 474, 477-78 (by implication).
293. See id. at 474-75, 477, 478. See also 28 U.S.C. 5 1783A(d) (1982) (state retains continuing
jurisdiction if it hasjurisdiction under state law and the child or a contestant remains a resident of the
state).
294. See 366 N.W.2d at 474-75, 477, 478.
295. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-14-03(1) (1981) (North Dakota hasjurisdiction under state law
if one of four prerequisites is met).
296. 366 N.W.2d at 476 (per Erickstad, C.J.).
297. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03(1)(b)(1981).
298. 366 N.W.2d at 477 (per Erickstad, C.J.).
299. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially).
300. Id.
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VandeWalle felt that North Dakota should retain jurisdiction over
the visitation provisions as long as Earl resides in North Dakota
30 1
and visitation is to occur there.
Justices Meschke and Levine believed that jurisdiction should
not be determined anew at the time of the petition for
modification. 30 2 In their view, if North Dakota had properly
exercised jurisdiction when it rendered the initial custody decree, it
retained jurisdiction as long as it had in personam jurisdiction over
the parties. 30 3 Because they believed that both requirements for
continuing jurisdiction were met, Justices Meschke and Levine felt
that the district court need not consider the issue of jurisdiction
3
further . 04
Patzer v. Glaser
In Patzer v. Glaser30 5 paternal grandparents contested a final
custody order that awarded the biological mother custody of her
five year old son. They challenged the order on the grounds that
exceptional circumstances existed because psychological bonding
between the grandparents and the child had occurred. 30 6 The
child, Steven, was born out of wedlock in May 1979, when the
mother, Cheri Glaser, was sixteen years old. 30 7 Rather than place
Steven for adoption, Cheri gave physical custody to Steven's
paternal grandparents. 30 8 In 1983, Cheri requested that the
grandparents return Steven to her custody. 30 9 The grandparents
refused, and initiated a custody action after Cheri took Steven away
from them. 3 10 The district court entered an order awarding Cheri
custody of Steven and rejecting the existence of psychological
311
bonding between the child and the grandparents.
The supreme court stated that parents have a right to the
custody and companionship of their children superior to the right of
any other person. 31 2 The court further stated that an award of
custody to the child's grandparents, rather than to a parent, is
301. Id.
302. Id. at 480 (Meschke, J., concurring specially).
303. Id. at 481.
304. Id. at 482.
305. 368 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1985).
306. Patzer v. Glaser, 368 N.W.2d 561, 563 (N.D. 1985).
307. Id. at 562.
308. Id. The paternal grandparents had physical custody of Steven for approximately four years
while Cheri completed school and sought employment. Id. at 563.
309. Id. at 563.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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clearly erroneous unless exceptional circumstances indicate that
such a custody disposition is in the best interests of the child.31 3 The
court concluded that insufficient evidence existed to enable a court
to determine whether the grandparents or the mother should
314
receive custody of Steven.
The court also noted that when evidence is inadequate for a
court to make an informed custody determination, expert
testimony should be introduced to evaluate the relationship
between the child and each of the disputing parties. 31 5 Therefore,
the court concluded that it was in the child's best interests to
remand the case for receipt of additional evidence upon which the
court could determine whether exceptional circumstances exist that
31 6
would justify awarding custody to the paternal grandparents.
Anderson v. Anderson
In Anderson v. Anderson31 7 Mary Anderson appealed from a
district court judgment granting her a divorce and dividing the
marital property. 3 18 She claimed that the trial court erred in
determining that certain farmland and mineral interests inherited
319
by her husband were not marital assets subject to division.
The supreme court stated that under section 14-05-24 of the
North Dakota Century Code, 320 the trial court in a divorce action
must consider all of the parties' real and personal property,
regardless of its source, as part of the marital estate. 32 1 The
supreme court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to
include the inherited farmland and mineral interests in the marital
estate.322
Mary also contended that the trial court erred in disallowing
testimony about the value of the inherited farmland by a local
farmer-landowner who had rented the farmland for five years and
who served as a member of the Federal Land Bank in Minot. 323 In
313. Id.
314. Id. at 564.
315. Id.
316. Id. Justice Levine dissented, and stated that the court should not remand cases when a trial
court has heard the evidence, weighed it, and concluded that exceptional circumstances do not exist.
Id. at 565- 66 (Levine, J., dissenting).
317. 368 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 1985).
318. Anderson v. Anderson, 368 N.W.2d 566, 567 (N.D. 1985).
319. Id. at 568.
320. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-05-24 (1981) (court must make equitable distribution of
property upon divorce).
321. 368 N.W.2d at 568 (citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 325 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1982); Herrick v.
Herrick, 316 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1982)).
322. Id. at 569. The supreme court stated that a division of property does not have to be equal to
be equitable. Id. The court merely emphasized that the inherited farmland and the mineral interests
should have been considered in determining the proper distribution of assets. Id.
323. Id.
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concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to let
the witness testify, the supreme court determined that the witness
had demonstrated that he was sufficiently familiar with the general
level of land values in the area to judge the value of the surface
3 24
interest in the farmland.
The court therefore reversed and remanded with directions
that the trial court redetermine the appropriate property division,
taking into consideration the inherited farmland and mineral
interests and that the court allow the parties to present evidence on
325
the value of the farmland.
Dahnerv. Daner
In Dahner v. Daner 26 Michael Daner appealed from a county
court order that allowed disbursements of proceeds from a personal
injury award to his minor child.3 27 Daner argued that the county
court erred in allowing invasion of a personal injury award and,
alternatively, that in making its determination to disburse the
3 28
proceeds the court applied the wrong standard.
In this case of first impression, the supreme court stated that
personal injury awards are generally left intact until the child
reaches the age of majority. 29 The court also emphasized that these
awards are "not community property for family use.' 3 3 0 However,
disbursements of an award will be justified in emergency situations
if no other alternative is reasonably available.3 3 The court must
apply a two-pronged test to determine whether disbursements will
be allowed.3 3 2 First, the court must determine whether it is
necessary to invade the award. 33 3 Second, if invasion is necessary
the court may, in its discretion, distribute sums deemed reasonably
necessary for the support, education, care, or benefit of the
minor.3 34 Because the county court failed to determine whether
invasion was necessary, the supreme court reversed and remanded
335
the case.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 570.
Id.
374 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1985).
Dahner v. Daner, 374 N.W.2d 604, 605 (N.D. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Cabin v. Lonkey, 53 Misc. 2d 171, __,

278 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (Civ. Ct.

1967)).
331.
332.
333.
334.
powers).
335.

Id. at 606.
Id.
Id.
Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-25 (1976) (conservator's distributive duties and
374 N.W.2d at 607.
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Bullock v. Bullock
In Bullock v. Bullock336 the issue was whether the district court
erred in awarding rehabilitative spousal support following a former
spouse's remarriage.3 37 Gerald and Patricia Bullock were granted a
divorce in August 1983.338 Pursuant to the divorce judgment,
Gerald was required to pay $1,200 per month in spousal support to
Patricia until her death. 339 Patricia remarried in June 1984.340
Gerald moved to amend the divorce judgment and terminate the
spousal support award based on Patricia's remarriage. 34 1 The
district court reduced the award to $800 of rehabilitative spousal
342
support per month.
The supreme court recognized that remarriage of the spousal
support recipient requires the termination of spousal support
except in extraordinary circumstances 43 Remarriage, therefore,
does not necessitate an automatic end to spousal support. 344 The
supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err in
determining that Patricia's need for more education to become
recertified as a teacher justified the continuance of rehabilitative
spousal support. 345 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the district
346
court's amended judgment of divorce.
Redmann v. Redmann

In Redmann v. Redmann347 Earl Redmann appealed from a
district court judgment awarding reinstatement of alimony
payments from Earl to Valeria Redmann as provided in the
parties' original divorce decree. 348 Valeria had entered into a
second marriage, but that marriage had been declared invalid by a
Montana court. 349 Following the annulment of her second
marriage, Valeria requested the district court to reinstate her
336. 376 N.W.2d 30 (N.D. 1985).
337. Bullock v. Bullock, 376 N.W.2d 30, 31 (N.D. 1985).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. The district court's amended judgment provided that the rehabilitative spousal support
was payable through and including December 1985. Id.
343. Id. (citing Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 328 (N.D. 1967)).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 32.
347. 376 N.W.2d 803 (N.D. 1985).
348. Redmann v. Redmann, 376 N.W.2d 803,803 (N.D. 1985).
349. Id. Valeria's second marriage was annulled because of fraud: her husband failed to disclose
to her that he had been previously married twice rather than once. Id.
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The district court entered a

judgment ordering reinstatement and Earl appealed. 3 5 '
The issue on appeal was whether Valeria was entitled to
reinstatement of her alimony payments.3 52 The supreme court
explained that generally an annulment has the effect of voiding the
marriage from the beginning. 353 Therefore, the court held that the
annulment of Valeria's second marriage rendered that marriage
void ab initio, as if the remarriage had not occurred, and entitled her
354
to reinstatement of alimony payments from Earl.
Although neither party referred to section 14-04-05 of the
North Dakota Century Code, the court briefly discussed its
potential applicability. 35 5 Section 14-04-05 provides: "A judgment
of nullity of marriage rendered is conclusive only as against the
parties to the action and those claiming under them. "356 The court
stated that since Earl had neither attacked the validity of the
Montana annulment, nor proved that the annulment was invalid
under North Dakota law as against third parties, the issue of
whether the annulment was binding against Earl could not be
35
determined on appeal.

7

INDIAN LAW
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Engineering, P. C.

Wold

In Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, P. C. 35 8 the North Dakota Supreme Court, on remand

from the United States Supreme Court,3 59 heard for the second
time the plaintiff Indian tribe's suit against a non-Indian
engineering firm for negligence in the design and construction of a
water supply system located on the reservation. 3 60 The issues on
350. Id.
351. Id. at 803-04.
352. Id. at 804.
353. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 68 N.W.2d 661,664 (N.D. 1955)).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-04-05 (1981).
357. 376 N.W.2d at 805.
358. 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985).
359. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 364
N.W.2d 98, 99 (N.D. 1985).
360. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321
N.W.2d 510, 510 (N.D. 1982). The district court initially dismissed the plaintiff Indian tribe's
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The tribe appealed, and the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 510, 513. The United States Supreme Court granted the tribe's
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remand were (1) whether state law precluded the exercise of state
court civil jurisdiction over Indian claims, 3 6' and (2) whether
chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code violated either
362
the state or federal constitution.

In deciding the first issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court
extensively analyzed case law and statutes which attempted to
resolve the jurisdictional conflict between state courts and Indian
claimants.

363

The court noted that section 2 of chapter 27-19

provided for tribal acceptance of state court civil jurisdiction by a
majority vote of the enrolled tribal members, 364 while section 5 of
chapter 27-19 provided for individual Indian acceptance of state
court civil jurisdiction. 365 The court reasoned that if the tribe
complied with section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code
and, acting as an individual "entity,"
consented to state
jurisdiction, then its claim against the defendant could be heard in
state district court. 3 66 Therefore, the court concluded that state law
did not preclude the exercise of state court civil jurisdiction over
3 67
Indian claims.
Because of this conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court
was required to disavow an earlier recognized theory that, pursuant
to federal law, an individual Indian could not confer jurisdiction
upon the state. 368 The court further concluded that chapter 27-19
terminated "residuary jurisdiction" if, in fact, any such
jurisdiction had previously existed .369
In deciding the second issue, the North Dakota Supreme
Court analyzed both the North Dakota Constitution and the
United States Constitution. 37 0 The tribe argued that the North
application for writ of certiorari, and subsequently remanded the case to the North Dakota Supreme
Court. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 104 S. Ct.
2267, 2273-74 (1984).
361. 364 N.W.2d at 101.
362. Id. at 104.
363. Id. at 100-03. The North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the background of the dispute
regarding state court civil jurisdiction over Indian claims by analyzing such provisions as the
Enabling Act of 1889, Public Law 280, Public Law 284, and chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id. at 100-01. The court also analyzed the purpose and legislative history of chapter
27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled the Indian Civil Jurisdiction Act. Id. at 101-03.
364. Id. at 103. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-02 (1974 & Supp. 1985). Section 2 of chapter 2719 of the North Dakota Century Code provides for tribal acceptance of state civil jurisdiction by a
majority vote of the enrolled reservation residents who are twenty-one years of age or older. Id.
365. 364 N.W.2D AT 103. See N.D. CENT. COOE S 27-19-05 (1974 & Supp. 1985). Section 5 of
chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code provides for individual acceptance of state civil
jurisdiction by execution of a statement declaring himself and his property as subject to such
jurisdiction. Id.
366. 364 N.W.2d at 103-04.
367. Id. The court noted that chapter 27-19 limits the exercise of the state judicial system upon
Indian people without their consent. Id. at 107.
368. Id. at 104. See Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). In Nelson the North Dakota
Supreme Court declared section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code inconsistent with
Public Law 284 and therefore void. Id. at 57.
369. 364 N.W.2d at 104.
370. Id. at 104-07.
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Dakota constitutional provisions that require courts to be open to
everyone, 37 1 a uniform operation of laws, 372 and original
jurisdiction of district courts over all cases, 373 were violated. 374 The
North Dakota Supreme Court stated that chapter 27-19 did not
375
violate any of the three constitutional provisions.
The tribe also argued that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution had been violated. 376 The court stated that the
tribe was not deprived of a protected interest, nor denied access
to state courts, because if the tribe complied with chapter 27-19 of
the North Dakota Century Code, it would be afforded access to
state courts. 377 The court further stated that the tribe's equal
protection rights were not violated. 378 The court reasoned that
chapter 27-19 actually treated the tribe more than equal because
the statute allows for both voluntary acceptance of, and subsequent
withdrawal from, state court civil jurisdiction.3 7 9 As a result, the
court concluded that neither state nor federal constitutional rights
38 0
were violated.
INSURANCE
Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck
In Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck3 81 the supreme
court affirmed a district court judgment in which several insurance
companies were awarded insurance proceeds, interest, and
punitive damages.3 8 2 In the early fall of 1971, Runck purchased
and placed insurance on a building and its contents. 383 The
building and its contents were destroyed by fire, which Runck had
371. Id. at 104. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 9 of article I of the North Dakota
Constitution provides that all courts shall be open to every man for any injury done to him, and that
due process requires immediate administration of justice. Id.
372. 364 N.W.2d at 104. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 22. Section 22 of article I of the North Dakota
Constitution provides as follows: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." Id.
373. 364 N.W.2d at 104. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8. Section 8 of article VI of the North
Dakota Constitution provides as follows: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
causes, except as otherwise provided by law, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by
law or by rule of the supreme court." Id.
374. 364 N.W.2d at 104.

375. Id.
376. Id. at 104-05.
377. Id. at 106.
378. Id. at 107.
379. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintifftribe was treated more than equal because they had
the option to accept or deny state court civil jurisdiction, while non-Indians could not exercise such
an option. Id.

380. Id. at 104.
381. 366. N.W.2d 788 (N.D. 1985).
382. Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck, 366 N.W.2d 788, 793 (N.D. 1985).

383. Id. at 790.
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arranged to be set, on December 18, 197 1.3"4 Runck stated to the
insurance companies, however, that he did not know what caused
the fire. 38 5 Therefore, the insurance
38 6
$75,715, the amount of Runck's loss.

companies

paid

Runck

The insurance companies eventually discovered Runck's
fraud and brought suit against him in district court. 38 7 The district

court concluded that the insurance companies could not reasonably
have discovered the fraud until late 1977 or early 1978 and that
they had established, by clear and convincing evidence, a scheme
by Runck to defraud them. 388 The district court awarded the
insurance companies the $75,715 paid to Runck, plus interest and
38

punititive damages.

9

Runck appealed the district court's decision on three grounds.
First, Runck contended that the trial court erred by applying
section 28-01-16(6) of the North Dakota Century Code rather than
section 28-01-24.390 Section 28-01-16(6) provides that in an action
for fraud, the statute of limitations is six years after discovery of the
fraud. 39 1 Section 28-01-24 provides that a fraudulent concealment
claim may commence one year from the date the fraud was
discovered or might reasonably have been discovered. 392 The

supreme court explained that section 28-01-24 is designed to extend
the time period within which an action, otherwise barred by the
statute of limitations, may be brought when fraudulent
concealment has prevented the aggrieved party from obtaining
knowledge of the existence of the cause of action. 393 Thus, the court
stated that section 28-01-24 is applicable only if an action is
3
otherwise barred by the passage of time.

94

Second, Runck asserted that because the insurance companies
failed to prove reliance, a necessary element in a fraud claim, they
had failed to meet their burden of proof. 395 The supreme court
concluded, however, that the trial court's finding of reasonable
396
reliance was not clearly erroneous.

Third, Runck asserted that the trial court erred in admitting
397
evidence of fires other than the one involved in the instant case.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id, at 791.
388. Id, at790,792.
389. Id at 789-90.
390. Id, at 790.
391. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-16(6) (Supp. 1985).
392. Id. 5 28-01-04 (Supp. 1985).
393. 366 N.W.2d at 791.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 792.
396. Id
397. Id, at 793.
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After noting that this was a nonjury trial, the court reasoned that
even if the evidence was incompetent, the evidence did not appear
to have induced the trial court judge to make a finding he would not
have otherwise made. 398

Thus, the court concluded

that the

admittance of that evidence was not error.399
Richard v. Fliflet
In Richard v. Fliflet 0 0 the district court determined that State
Farm Insurance Company had properly rescinded the automobile
insurance policy it issued to Merlin Lende, since Lende had
misrepresented ownership in his insurance application.4 0 1 The
policy in question had been purchased voluntarily and was not
issued pursuant to the North Dakota financial responsibility laws
40 2
contained in chapter 39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code.
On appeal, the issue was whether State Farm could properly
40 3
rescind the policy after an accident had occurred.
Section 39-16.1-11(6)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code
prohibits insurers from rescinding insurance policies issued
40 4
pursuant to chapter 39-16.1 after an accident has occurred.
Although the policy purchased by Lende was not issued pursuant to
that Chapter, 40 5 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
section 39-16.1-11(6)(a) applied to all voluntarily purchased
liability insurance policies.40 6 Therefore, State Farm could not
40
rescind the policy after the accident.

7

The court relied on a number of factors in reaching its
conclusion. The court noted that section 39-08-20 requires all
drivers to have liability insurance in the amount required by
chapter 39-16.1 .408 The court further stated that section 39-16-05
imposes penalties against motor vehicle owners or operators
involved in traffic accidents who do not subsequently establish their
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 370 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1985).
401. Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 530 (N.D. 1985). The actual owner of the automobile
was Daniel Bye. Id. at 529. Bye did not apply for the insurance in his own name because he had a
previous conviction for driving while intoxicated, which would have resulted in higher insurance
premiums. Id. at 536 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 530. See also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-16.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985) (certain drivers must
provide proof of ability to respond to future damage awards).
403. 370 N.W.2d at 530.
404. See id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11(1), (6) (a) (Supp. 1985) (insurance policy
may not be cancelled or annulled after injury or damage occurs).
405. 370 N.W.2d at 530.
406. Id. at 535.
407. See id.
408. Id. at 534. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (Supp. 1985) (compulsory insurance
statute).
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financial ability to respond to damages.40 9 The sanctions of section
39-16-05 are not applicable, however, to a driver who, at the time
of the accident, has liability insurance that provides "substantially
the same coverage" as policies issued pursuant to chapter 3916.1.410
The court determined that allowing the rescission of an
insurance policy after an accident would not afford "substantially
the same coverage" as policies issued pursuant to chapter 3916. 1.411 Thus, the court concluded that North Dakota's strong
public policy of protecting innocent traffic accident victims from
financial hardship would be nullified if an insurer could cancel a
liability insurance policy after an accident. 4 12
Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc.
In Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc. 413 Edwin Carlson purchased an
insurance policy from American Insurance Company (American)
in the name of "Edwin 0. Carlson dba Aero Block & Cement
Company and Carlson Trucking. ' 4 14 An employee was injured
while working on Carlson's farm, Harrington Ranch, and
American refused to cover the claim. 4 15 American claimed that
Harrington Ranch was a separate entity not covered by Carlson's
4 16
insurance policy.
The supreme court held that when the insured is named as
"Individual dba. . . " the individual is the named insured
regardless of what follows the "dba. ' ' 4 17 The court reasoned that
since Aero Block & Cement and Carlson Trucking are not separate
legal entities they could not enter into a contract.4 18 Since no other
entity was capable of entering into the insurance contract, the party
who contracted with American was Edwin Carlson. 4 19 Thus, the
court concluded that all of Carlson's businesses that operated as
409. 370 N.W.2d at 532 (quoting Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870,
880 (N.D. 1975)). Section 39-16-05 of the North Dakota Century Code authorizes the state highway
commissioner to suspend the license of any driver involved in a traffic accident, unless the driver
deposits security in a sum determined by the commissioner or the driver purchases an acceptable
liability insurance policy. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-16-05 (Supp. 1985).
410. See 370 N.W.2d at 534-35. See also N.D. CENT. CooE 39-16-05(2) (Supp. 1985) (sanctions
not imposed if driver's insurance coverage is substantially the same as that required by chapter 3916.1).
411. 370 N.W.2d at 535.
412. Id.
413. 372 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 1985).
414. Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 902, 904 (N.D. 1985).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 906.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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sole proprietorships were covered by the insurance policy.420 The
court further concluded that limitations on the coverage of a policy
should be accomplished by specific exclusions and endorsements to
a policy, not by attempting to limit the designation of the named
421
insured.
The court also addressed the issue of whether Carlson's failure
to obtain primary coverage for the injury suffered by his employee
precluded coverage under an umbrella policy. 422 The court found
that the applicable provision of the umbrella policy did not wholly
deny coverage if the primary policy is never acquired.4 23 Thus, the
court reversed the judgment and remanded to determine, among
other things, whether Carlson had in fact failed to obtain primary
424
coverage.
Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v.DaiylandInsurance Co.
425
In Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co.
Dairyland appealed a summary judgment which determined that
Dairyland, and not Milbank, had an obligation to cover and a duty
to defend an action against its insured. 4 26 On October 15, 1980,
Robert Sabot was seriously injured when a 1500-pound hay bale
fell from a truck and struck him.4 27 Sabot subsequently died,
although not from the injuries sustained in the accident. 42 8 Sabot's
wife then initiated a negligence action against Hagstrom, the owner
of the truck and hay bale, to recover damages for Sabot's
injuries. 42 9 At the time of the accident, Hagstrom had two
insurance policies in force - an automobile policy issued by
4 30
Dairyland and a farm/ranch owners policy issued by Milbank.
Both Dairyland and Milbank denied that they had a duty to
4 31
provide coverage or to defend Hagstrom's lawsuit.
Dairyland contended that Sabot's injuries did not arise out of
the "ownership, maintenance or use of a car or other motor
4 32
vehicle," as required by the terms of Hagstrom's policy.
Dairyland reasoned that the definition of "operation of a motor
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

Id. at 907.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id. at 908 & n. 3.
373 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1985).
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 373 N.W.2d 888,889 (N.D. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id.

432. Id.
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vehicle," which at the time of trial was codified at section 26-4103(11) of the North Dakota Century Code, excluded insurance
coverage for injuries arising "in the course of loading and
unloading [a] vehicle." 4 3 The supreme court concluded that the
statute should not be incorporated into the insurance policy issued
by Dairyland. 434 The court reasoned that the chapter containing
section 26-41-03(11), by its express language, is limited to "no
fault" benefits. 43 5 Thus, that section had no applicability to
436
automobile liability coverage.
After concluding that section 26-41-03(11) did not apply, the
court construed the following phrase of Dairyland's policy: "arises
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a car or other motor
vehicle.

' 437

The court noted that application of the "causal

connection test" determines whether an accident is the result of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle. 438 In other words,

for coverage to exist, the injury must result from the inherent
nature of the vehicle. 439 The court concluded that an injury suffered

while unloading bales from a truck was an injury resulting from the
inherent nature of a truck. 440 Thus, the court held that Dairyland
did have an obligation to provide coverage and also had a duty to
4 41
defend.
Dairyland also appealed the district court's conclusion that
Milbank had no obligation to provide coverage nor a duty to
defend. 442 The Milbank policy provided that "[t]his policy does not
433. Id. at 891. See Auto Accident Reparations Act, ch. 265, S 3, 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws 796,.
repealedby Act of Mar. 27, 1985, ch. 316, § 22, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 1022. Prior to its repeal, section
26-41-03(11) of the North Dakota Century Code provided as follows:
"Operation of a motor vehicle" means operation, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle as a vehicle. Operation of a motor vehicle does not include conduct within the
course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles
unless the injury occurs off the business premises, or conduct in the course of loading
and unloading the vehicle....
N.D. CENT. CODE S 26-41-03(11) (1978).
Since the supreme court's decision in Milbank, the North Dakota Legislature has revised the
insurance code. See Act of Mar. 27, 1985, ch. 316, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 1022 (insurance code
revision). The definition of "operation of a motor vehicle" contained in the Auto Accident
Reparations Act has been recodified at § 26.1-41-01(13). See id. S 18 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5
26.1-41-01(13) (Supp. 1985)).
434. 373 N.W.2d at 892.
435. Id. The court noted that the introductory sentence of S 26-41-03 limited application of the
section to the North Dakota no-fault insurance law contained in chapter 26-41 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id. The court further emphasized that no-fault benefits are distinct from liability
coverage. Id.
436. Id.
437. Seeid.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at893.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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apply . . . to bodily injury or property damage arising out of...
loading or unloading . .
. ,,144 The court concluded that the
language of the policy unambiguously excluded coverage in the
instant case. 444 Therefore, the court concluded that summary
4 5
judgment was proper and affirmed the district court's judgment. 4
PRISONS
Varnson v. Satran
In Varnson v. Satran446 an inmate appealed from a district court
judgment denying his application for post conviction relief. 44 7 The
inmate, Varnson, was charged with violating prison rules by
possessing marijuana, and in an attempt to exonerate himself,
voluntarily submitted to a polygraph test. 448 After administering
two polygraph tests, the polygraph operator determined that
Varnson answered questions deceptively . 4 4 9 Subsequently, the
prison adjustment committee found Varnson guilty of violating a
4 50
prison rule, and the parole board denied his request for parole.
In his application for post conviction relief, Varnson claimed
that his due process rights were denied by the adjustment
committee's and the parole board's sole reliance on the results of
the polygraph tests. 4 5' The supreme court determined that the
polygraph results were not the only evidence considered by the
prison adjustment committee and parole board in finding that
Varnson violated prison rules. 45 2 The court noted that prison
officials considered an incident report prepared by the prison
employee who searched Varnson arid found the marijuana, an
investigative report of the incident prepared by a Bureau of
45 3
Criminal Investigation officer, and Varnson's own statement.
Varnson also asserted that consideration of the polygraph test
results denied his due process rights because the results were
443. Id. at 894.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1985).
447. Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533, 534 (N.D. 1985).
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 534-35.
451. Id. at 535.
452. Id. at 536-37.
453. Id. at 536. The deputy warden at the penitentiary stated by affidavit that the adjustment
committee had "performed its own fact finding function with a formal hearing," and that based on
those findings, the polygraph results only confirmed what the evidence revealed. Id. In addition, the
chief parole officer stated that the parole board's finding was supported by sufficient evidence
independent from the test results. Id.

19861

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

"inherently unreliable and incompetent evidence.' ' 4 4 The court
distinguished cases that address the admissibility of polygraph test
results in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings from cases
that involve a prison disciplinary proceeding. 455 The supreme court
emphasized that due process does not require the same rights or
procedural safeguards in prison disciplinary proceedings as are
required in civil or criminal proceedings. 45 6 Therefore, the court
concluded that consideration by the adjustment committee and the
parole board of the polygraph test results did not violate Varnson's
due process rights, since the tests were voluntary and the results
457
were not the only evidence considered by the prison officials.
PROBATE
In re Estate of Tuntland
In In re Estate of Tuntland4 58 the North Dakota Department of
Human Services (State) appealed from a judgment that allowed
Monroe Tuntland's estate to pay funeral expenses of $4,047.70.
Because Tuntland was a former recipient of medical and old age
assistance, 459 the State filed a claim against the decedent's estate for
reimbursement of the assistance he had received. 460 However, the
4 61
estate did not have enough assets to pay the State's claim in full.
The State contended that it had a preferred claim over the
funeral home because section 50-24.1-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that "the total amount of medical
assistance paid on behalf of a decedent following his sixty-fifth
birthday shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the
decedent's estate after funeral expenses not in excess of fourteen
hundred dollars." ' 462 However, section 30.1-19-05 provides that if
the assets of an estate are insufficient to pay all claims in full,
reasonable funeral expenses are to be paid before "[d]ebts and
taxes with preference under other laws of this State.' '463 The county

454. Id. at 537.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 538. The supreme court affirmed Varnson in Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.
1985).
458. 364 N.W.2d 513 (N.D. 1985).
459. In re Estate ofTuntland, 364 N.W.2d 513, 514 (N.D. 1985).
460. Id. Tuntland had received $4,321.09 in assistance: $3,647.09 in medical assistance and
$674.00 in old age assistance. Id.
461. Id. at 515. The State received $2,166.60 of its $4,321.09 claim. Id.
462. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07 (1982).
463. N.D. CENr. CODE § 30.1-19-05 (1976).
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court concluded that the $1,400 limitation of section 50-24.1-07
did not take precedence over section 30.1-19-05.464
Section 1-02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that when an irreconcilable conflict exists between a general
provision in a statute and a special provision in the same or another
statute, then the special provision prevails. 465 The court noted that
section 30.1-19-05(1) is a general provision contained in the
4 66
Probate Code, while section 50-24.1-07 is a special provision.
Thus, the supreme court concluded that the $1,400 limitation
on the payment of funeral expenses controls the general probate
provision.467
The appellee contended that the State could not recover
moneys paid to the decedent for old age assistance because the
statute which governed old age assistance had been repealed. 468
The supreme court disagreed and noted that the legislature
specifically provided that the repeal would not prevent the State
469
from recovering from the estate of deceased recipients.
Concluding that the State was entitled to payment of $2,129.49, the
470
court reversed and remanded the judgment of the county court.
In re Estate of Erickson
In In re Estate of Erickson47 1 Winnifred Erickson, widow of the
decedent, appealed from a county court order which concluded that
the decedent had died intestate with respect to real property located
472
in North Dakota and from an order denying her a new trial.
Robert and Winnifred Erickson, both residents of Washington,
were married in 1956.471 In 1973 Robert inherited mineral interests
in land located in North Dakota. 474 In 1974 Robert and Winnifred
executed a community property agreement, which stated that all
property owned or later acquired by them would be considered
community property. 4 75 After Robert's death, William Erickson,
464. 364 N.W.2d at 515.
465. N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-07 (1975).
466. 364 N.W.2d at 516. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-05(1) (1976) (UNIF. PROBATE CODE S
3-805); id. § 50-24.1-07 (1982).
467. 364 N.W.2d at 516.
468. Id. Tuntland had been a recipient of old age assistance under chapter 50-24 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which was subsequently repealed and replaced by a program administered by
the federal government. Id. at 516-17. See Act of Apr. 3, 1979, ch. 513, § 1, 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws
1297 (repealing N.D. CENT. CODEch. 50-24).
469. 364 N.W.2d at 517.
470. Id.
471. 368 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1985).
472. In re Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 526 (N.D. 1985).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 526-27.
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Robert's son by prior marriage, obtained a county court order
which determined that Robert died intestate and authorized
476
distribution of the North Dakota property.
Initially the supreme court determined that the appeal was
timely filed. 47 7 The court also determined that the county court
acted within its jurisdiction, since the court did not employ any
powers unavailable to a court lacking equity jurisdiction'478
Finally, the court concluded that the community property
agreement had no effect on the decedent's North Dakota property
because the agreement was not a testamentary instrument capable
4 79
of rendering North Dakota property community property.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the orders of the county
48 0
court.
TORTS
Hoerr v. NorthfieldFoundry and Machine Co.
In Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry and Machine Co. 48 , G.C. Peterson

Company, Inc. (Peterson) appealed from an amended order of the
District Court of Cass County which awarded the plaintiff, Hoerr,
$47,266.88 in damages plus costs and disbursements.4 82 On August
20, 1982 Hoerr had parts of three fingers severed while working
with a wood shaper. 48 3 Hoerr commenced a products liability
action against Northfield Foundry (Northfield), Peterson, and
Country Hill Cabinets (Country), the manufacturer, distributor,
and retailer of the wood shaper. 484 The action was based primarily

on the theories of negligence and strict liability in tort. 485 Hoerr
then entered into release agreements with two defendants,
Northfield and Country. 486 The case went to trial against the
remaining defendant, Peterson, 48 7 and the jury issued a two-part
476. Id. at 527.
477. Id. at 528-29. The court ruled that the time for filing an appeal commenced running after
the denial of appellant's motion for a new trial rather than at the original order of intestacy. Id. at
528.
478. Id. at 529.
479. Id. at 529-30. The court distinguished previous decisions involving agreements by a
decedent's heirs after the decedent's death to distribute property in a particular manner. Id. at 529.
The court also distinguished cases involving property acquired with community property funds. Id.
at 530.
480. Id. at 530.
481. 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1985).
482. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry and Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 324-25 (N.D. 1985).
483. Id. at 325.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
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special verdict. 488 On the strict liability claim, the jury found the
manufacturer, Northfield, 65% liable; the distributors, Peterson,
25% liable; and the retailer, Country, 10% liable.4 8 9 On the
negligence claim,, however, the jury found Northfield 10% liable,
Peterson 451% liable, Country 22.5% liable, and Hoerr's employer
22.5% liable.4 90 Hoerr then requested judgment on the negligence
verdict, and received an order granting judgment against Peterson
49 1
for 67.5 % of the damages sustained.
Peterson appealed the judgment on two grounds. First,
Peterson claimed that the trial court erred in allowing Hoerr to
elect to have judgment entered on the negligence claim rather than
the strict liability claim. 492 The supreme court concluded that the
trial court did not err in allowing Hoerr to choose the theory of
judgment. 49 3 The court reasoned that merely because Hoerr was
entitled to recover under alternative theories, there was no basis for
494
denying him the greatest recovery.
Peterson next asserted that the district court erred in holding it
liable for the employer's share of the negligence. 495 Peterson
claimed that pursuant to Bartels v. City of Williston,4 9 6 when Hoerr
entered into release agreements with Northfield and Country, he
waived the joint and several liability protection provided in section
9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code. 497 The supreme court
concluded that the district court did not err in holding Peterson
liable for the employer's share of negligence.4 9 It reasoned that
since the employer was not voluntarily released by the plaintiff, as
was the case in Bartels, releasing Peterson from the employer's share
of negligence would violate the joint and several liability
protections provided in section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 499 Thus, the court affirmed the order of the district
court.500
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 325-26. The judgment amount represents the negligence shares of Peterson and
Hoerr's employer. See id. at 325. The employee was immune from suit under the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01
(1985).
492. 376 N.W.2d at 327.
493. Id. at 328.
494. Id. (quoting Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 564-65, 410 A.2d 674,
682-83 (1980)).
495. 376 N.W.2d at 328.
496. 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979). In Bartels, a general liability release was held to be a waiver
of rights under the joint and several liability statute. Bartels v. City ofWilliston, 276 N.W.2d 1.13,
122 (N.D. 1979).
497. See Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 328. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (when two or more
parties are jointly liable, each shall bejointly and severally liable for the whole award).
498. 376 N.W.2d at 334.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 335.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Snortland v. Larson
In Snortland v. Larson50 1 Larson appealed from a district court
order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, a new trial. 50 2 Snortland leased 1,560 acres of
Minnesota farmland to Larson. 50 3 Larson informed Snortland that
he was abandoning the leased property before the first rent
payment was due. 50 4 Snortland subsequently advertised the
property and accepted the highest bid, which was approximately
half of what Larson's payments would have been under the original
lease. 50 5 Snortland sued Larson for the payments due under the
50 6
original lease, less the new lessee's rent payments.
Larson asserted that the district court erred by not concluding
as a matter of Minnesota law that reletting land, in the absence of a
right-of-reentry clause, constitutes an acceptance of the
abandonment of the property.5 0 7 Both Larson and Snortland were
North Dakota residents at the time of the lease.5 08 However, the
supreme court did not reach the conflict of law issue because both
50 9
parties agreed that Minnesota law should govern the dispute.
The court found that, under the facts of the leading Minnesota
case, a reletting of abandoned property necessarily and as a matter
of law brings a previous tenancy to an end. 510 However, the court
distinguished the Minnesota case because Snortland informed
Larson of his intent to relet the land and to hold Larson to the terms
of the lease, while Larson still could have insisted on his right to
possess the property. 51 1 The court reasoned that Snortland should
not be penalized for minimizing damages and putting the land to
5 12
beneficial use.
The court concluded that Snortland's acceptance could not be
decided as a matter of law. 51 3 The court further concluded that
substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Snortland did
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.

364 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1985).
Snortland v. Larson, 364 N.W.2d 67, 67 (N.D. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 73. See Haycock v.Johnson, 81 Minn. 49, 83 N.W. 494(1900).
364 N.W.2d at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:35

not accept Larson's abandonment.5 14 Therefore, the court affirmed
the order of the district court denying Larson's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a
1 5

new trial. 5

Holcomb v. Zinke
In Holcomb v. Zinke5t 6 the Zinkes appealed from the trial court's
judgment rescinding a contract for the sale of their home to the
Holcombs. 5 17 The trial court determined that the Zinkes committed

constructive fraud by suppressing material facts from the
Holcombs, including defects in the sewage, water, and heating
systems. 51 8 The central issue on appeal was whether the trial court
erred in using constructive fraud, as defined in section 9-03-09 of
the North Dakota Century Code, 519 as a basis for granting
rescission. 520
The supreme court concluded that the seller of real property
has a duty to disclose material facts that are known, or should be
known, to the seller and that are not reasonably discoverable by the
buyer. 52 1 Constructive fraud justifiably places the duty on the
seller, since he has superior knowledge of the home and its
defects. 522 The court determined that the other elements required
for constructive fraud were proven 523 and that the defects the
Zinkes had failed to disclose were material and not reasonably
discoverable. 52 4 Because the Zinkes had committed constructive
fraud, and the other elements necessary for rescission were
established, 525 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's order of
rescission. 526
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Gregory v. North Dakota Workmen's CompensationBureau
In Gregory v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau52 7 the
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
517. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 509 (N.D. 1985).
518. Id. at 510-11.
519. Id. at 511. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-03-09 (1975). Subsection (1) of 5 9-03-09 provides that
constructive fraud occurs when a person breaches a duty which, without fraudulent intent, gains an
advantage by misleading another person to his prejudice. Id.
520. 365 N.W.2d at 510-11. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02 (1975) (requirements for rescission
of a contract).
521. 365 N.W.2d at 512.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 513.
524. Id. at 512.
525. Id. at 513.
526. Id. at 514.
527. 369 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1985).
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Bureau appealed a district court judgment that the payment rate
for impairments under section 65-05-12 of the North Dakota
Century Code was the statutory rate in effect at the time the
impairment was determined, rather than the statutory rate in effect
on the date of injury. 5 28 In 1958 Gregory was severely injured
during the course of employment.5 29 Following a lengthy
convalescence, he returned to work and remained employed until
530
1981 when the recurring effects of the injury forced him to quit.
As a result, Gregory requested a permanent personal impairment
award in 1983.531 The Bureau granted a permanent partial
impairment award based on the rate in effect at the time of
injury. 532
The issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was
"whether the rate of payment for a permanent partial impairment
award ... is the statutory rate in effect at the time the impairment
was determined, or the statutory rate in effect on the date the
compensable injury occurred.' ,533 The court stated that, according
to section 65-05-09 workmen's compensation benefits are based on
the rate at the time of the first disability or recurrence of that
disability. 534 The court reasoned that the North Dakota Legislature
had clearly intended the rate in effect at the time of the disability, or
recurring disability, to control, and that the date of the injury may
535
or may not be that time.
The supreme court declared that the rate in effect at the time
that the impairment was determined controlled the amount of the
permanent partial impairment award. 536 Thus, Gregory's rate of
payment was determined from the date of the permanent
impairment determination in 1983.537 The court also rejected the
Bureau's argument that the holding could create an administrative
nightmare if existing claimants were to assert an entitlement to
higher benefit rates for past awards. 538 The court stated that the
principles of res judicata precluded the reopening of past awards
539
that have been finally determined.
528.
1985).
529.
530.
531.

Gregory v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 369 N.W.2d 119, 120 (N.D.
Id.
Id.
Id.

532. Id.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

Id. at 121.
Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-05-09 (1985) (compensation for recurrence of a disability).
369 N.W.2d at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Sunderland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
5 40
In Sunderland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
the Bureau denied compensation benefits to Sunderland, a police
officer who died from lung cancer. 541 Sunderland's wife appealed to
the District Court of Grand Forks County, which reversed the
Bureau's decision and ordered the payment of benefits. 542 On
appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Bureau contended
that (1) lung cancer was not compensable under North Dakota law,
(2) Sunderland had the burden to establish the link between his
employment and his cancer, and (3) medical evidence showed that
Sunderland's lung cancer was in no way related to his occupation
543
as a police officer.
The supreme court rejected each of the Bureau's contentions
and noted two presumptions created in favor of firemen and law
enforcement officers by section 65-01-02(12)(d) of the North
Dakota Century Code.5 44 Pursuant to subsection 65-01-02(12)(d) a
lung disease is presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty
and is also presumed not to be a preexisting disease. 54 5 The
supreme court held that in order for the Bureau to rebut these
presumptions, it must show that Sunderland's lung cancer was
preexisting and that it was not work related. 54 6 The supreme court
concluded that the Bureau failed to meet its burden of rebutting
these presumptions.5 47 Therefore, the court affirmed the district
court's decision ordering payment of workmen's compensation
54
benefits to Sunderland. 1

Moore v. North Dakota Workmen's CompensationBureau
In Moore v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau549 the
supreme court invalidated a provision of the North Dakota
540. 370 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1985).
541. Sunderland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 370 N.W.2d 549, 551
(N.D. 1985).
542. Id.
543. Id. at 553. The medical evidence that the Bureau considered in denying Sunderland's
application for compensation benefits included: Sunderland's medical history; reports from every
doctor he had seen concerning his cancer; his family history of cancer; his smoking history;
documented complaints of stress; and a letter from a doctor stating that Sunderland's cancer was not
caused by his occupation as a police officer. Id.
544. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(12)(d)(1985).
545. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-02(12)(d) (1985).
546. 370 N.W.2d at 554.
547. Id. The court determined that not only had the Bureau erred in concluding that the
claimant had the burden to prove that his career was work related, but also that medical evidence did
not sustain the Bureau's finding that the cancer was not work related. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S2832-19(5) (Supp. 1985) (a court shall not affirm an agency decision, if the facts are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence).
548. 370 N.W.2d at 554.
549. 374. N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1985).
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81

Administrative Code that limited the payment of a workmen's
compensation claimant's attorney fees to those instances in which a
claim had been denied or reduced. 550 Moore had been receiving
workmen's compensation benefits for a broken back suffered at
work. 55t He sought to have his benefits paid in a lump sum that
would equal the value of all future payments of compensation as
provided by section 65-05-25 of the North Dakota Century
5 52
Code.
The Bureau denied Moore's request for a lump sum payment
and his request for attorney fees, concluding that Moore's claim
had not been denied or reduced, a prerequisite for payment of
attorney fees under section 92-01-02-11 of the North Dakota
Administrative Code. 553 The district court affirmed the order of the
Bureau and Moore appealed. 554 Moore's sole contention on appeal
was that the Bureau erred in denying his request for attorney
fees.555
In examining the issue, the supreme court noted that section
65-02-08 provides for the payment of a claimant's attorney fees for
proceedings before the Bureau.55 6 The court concluded that the
statute could not be interpreted to limit the right to those situations
in which a claim is reduced or denied. 557 The court stated that it is a
basic rule of administrative law that a regulation may not exceed
the authority granted by the legislature, and that a statute or
regulation which does so is void. 558 Because the Bureau's regulation
was inconsistent with the provisions of section 65-02-08, the court
held that the Bureau had exceeded its authority by awarding
attorney fees only for claims that have been denied or reduced. 5 59
The case was reversed and remanded for a determination of the
amount of attorney fees to which Moore was entitled for both the
560
Bureau proceeding and the appeal to the district court.
550. Moore v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 374 N.W.2d 71, 75 (N.D.
1985).
551. Id. at 73.
552. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-05-25 (1985) (lump sum settlement granted at the discretion
of Bureau).
553. 374 N.W.2d at 73. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE S 92-01-02-11 (1978) (attorney fees paid from
time claim is denied or reduced). The Bureau reasoned that because Moore would continue to
receive periodic benefits, and because the lump sum payment would have been equal to the present
value of all future benefits, the Bureau had not "denied or reduced" Moore's claim. 374 N.W.2d at
73.
554. 374 N.W.2d at 72.
555. Id.
556. Id. at 74. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-02-08 (1985) (Bureau shall pay attorney fees for
proceedings before it).
557. 374 N.W.2d at 74.
558. Id. at 74 (citing Steele v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 273 N.W.2d
692,701 (N.D. 1978)).
559. Id. at 75.
560. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-02-08 (1985) (Bureau shall pay attorney fees for proceedings
before it; id. § 65-10-03 (1985) (cost of appeal and attorney fees set by the appellate court and
assessed against the Bureau).

